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Abstract
Barry E. Hawk reviews Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power. This Book
Review states that Professor Giuliano Amato has successfully written a refreshing and insightful
book on antitrust policy after more than a century of US debate and almost half a century of
European debate. In his highly enlightening opus on Antitrust and the Bounds of Power, Professor
Amato writes from the Olympian heights as the former head of the well respected Italian Antitrust
Authority, a former Prime Minister of Italy, and a present professor at the European University
Institute in Florence. The book places antitrust law in the broader context of political theory and
history. Although the author modestly states that the book is written for young people embarking
on an immersion in antitrust law, seasoned antitrust veterans will greatly benefit from Professor
Amato’s measured wisdom.

GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE
BOUNDS OF POWER
Reviewed by Barry E. Hawk*
It is a difficult challenge to write a refreshing and insightful
book on antitrust policy after more than a century of U.S. debate
and almost half a century of European debate. Professor Giuliano Amato successfully has met that challenge in his highly enlightening opus on Antitrust and the Bounds of Power.1 Professor
Amato writes from the Olympian heights as the former head of
the well respected Italian Antitrust Authority, a former Prime
Minister of Italy, and the present professor at the European University Institute in Florence. As might be expected from an author with such broad public experience, Antitrust and the Bounds
of Power places antitrust law in the broader context of political
theory and history. Although the author modestly states that the
book is written for young people embarking on an immersion in
antitrust law, seasoned antitrust veterans will greatly benefit from
Professor Amato's measured wisdom.
Professor Amato begins with the judgment that the desirable introduction of increasingly sophisticated economic analysis
into antitrust law has obscured some of the problems and policy
goals that antitrust law was born to deal with. He persuasively
places the genesis of antitrust both in the United States and in
Europe in politics, notably the political values underlying liberal
democracy. According to Professor Amato, liberal democracy
faces the following dilemma: the fundamental freedom of individuals to trade can lead to the opposite phenomenon of private
power that is capable of infringing not just the economic freedom of other individuals but also the balance of public decisions. In a democratic society two boundaries should never be
crossed: one beyond which the unlegitimated power of individuals arises, the other beyond which legitimate public power becomes illegitimate. Antitrust law is relevant to understanding
both sides of the divide and to deciding where the boundaries
should be set. Professor's Amato's book is devoted to this gen* Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York; Director, Fordham Corporate
Law Institute.
1. GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER (1997).
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eral theme and his explication of antitrust law is set against the
background of this political dilemma in a liberal democracy.
Chapter One sets forth a brief but perceptive analysis of the
early history of the Sherman Act case law. Several interesting
observations are made. For example, Professor Amato reads the
early decisions as points on a continuous line seeking to define a
new boundary on market power, marked no longer by the alternative of freedom and coercion, but by respect for, or distortion
of, the economic rules laid down for the market itself by the
competitive system. He then draws the more general political
observation that the defenders of the old common law boundary
could see that the boundary had been shifted forward to allow
intrusions on freedom of contract that they perceived as opposed to the very foundations of liberal society.
Chapter Two deals with the more recent period in United
States antitrust enforcement, notably the influence of the socalled Chicago School. Here, again, Professor's Amato's observations are nuanced and balanced. On the one hand, he expresses doubts whether "consumer welfare" can be restricted to a
concept of lower prices and better product quality to the detriment of diversity of consumer choice of more suppliers and
products.2 On the other hand, he praises the Chicago School
for having focused antitrust enforcement on market power and
efficiency.'
Chapter Three explores the history of European antitrust or
competition law. Its modern history begins with the German antitrust laws in the 1950s which had their inspiration in the socalled Freiburg School or "Freiburger Ordoliberalen." The Freiburg School was concerned about non-legitimate private power
and the necessity to provide a solid institutional framework for
the competitive economy to prevent both formation of private
power and the creation with it, by linking up with public power,
of conglomerates that could engender tragedies such as occurred during the Nazi period.4 The Freib'urg School's mistrust
of economic power because it can lead to political power is
echoed in the historical roots of U.S. antitrust law. The history
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Id. at 40-41; see also David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizingthe Economy: German NeoLiberalism, Comparative Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 25 (1994).
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of EC competition law is strikingly different, however, in its emphasis on market integration as a goal even to the subordination
of competition. This heavy emphasis on market integration and
the formalism adopted by many antitrust officials and practitioners has resulted in, on the one hand, formalisms and rigidities
and, on the other hand, permissive flexibilities that are peculiarly European in origin. As Professor Amato demonstrates, the
EC's position towards vertical restraints is perhaps the best example. Indeed, Professor Amato refers to the EC law on vertical
restraints as "European duplicity."
As Professor Amato points out, the market integration goal
is not the sole explanation for the differences in results between
U.S. antitrust law and European competition law. More fundamentally, there is a difference in "antitrust culture," i.e. the persistence of a rooted European Culture of regulating and controlling the economy. Amato writes convincingly that EC competition policy rests on two ideas that are in tension: 1) the old idea
of supremacy of state power which is above the powers of private
individuals and is the most suitable instrument to confront private power; and 2) the new idea of competition in the sense that
private power is simply a degeneration of freedom against which
the freedom of all must be guaranteed. In other words, in Europe there is still the tendency to prefer that government set the
boundary between economic power and freedom of enterprises
and not the constitutionally recognized solidity of specific freedoms of each and all.5 ' In contrast, the United States is 'molie
accepting of private power, continuing to see it as a natural manifestation or expression of private freedoms and thus preferred
to the interventions of public power.6
This European itch to regulate, or at least reluctance to let
markets self-correct, explains many differences between E C and
U.S. antitrust law and policy - for example, the EC resort to
block exemptions and the inclusion of non-competition policy
objectives in antitrust law, such as "industrial policy," or social
and regional policies.' Another important example concerns
abusive or monopolistic behavior by dominant firms where the
European itch to regulate also can be seen in the EC's broader
5. See AMATO, supra note 1, at 54.
6. Id. at 76-77.
7. Id. at 63-64.
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and stricter application of its antitrust laws to dominant firm behavior under Article 86 as compared with Section 2 of the Sher8
man Act.
The difference in scope between Article 86 and Section 2
rests on the European concern with protecting trading partners
that are "dependent" on dominant firms, even where this concern conflicts with consumer welfare considerations. In other
words, there is a strong tendency under Article 86 (as well as
under the EEC Merger Regulation 9 ) to protect competitors and
not simply competition.
This tendency to protect competitors, or at least to be unduly sensitive toward effect on competitors as opposed to effect
on consumers and consumer welfare, can also be seen in the
Commission's occasionally perverse treatment of efficiencies
under the EEC Merger Regulation. As Professor Amato points
out, the Commission in some cases appears to take the extreme
that greater efficiency is not a positive factor in reviewing mergers but a negative one and thus has protected consumers not
because of market foreclosure and the associated restriction of
output but out of a concern for maintaining pluralism and defending the right to sell to small producers currently on the market.10
The recent evolution of EC competition law suggests, however, that there is a greater emphasis on protecting competition
and perhaps even the liberation of antitrust law from the multiple purposes it has served in the past." Professor Amato
strongly approves of this change and notes that it may result in
the weakening of the old regulatory propensity. This would
mean rooting antitrust more in the encounter between freedoms and economic rights at stake and less in the tradition of
balancing varying public interests; it also would mean making
economics the primary yardstick of antitrust analysis. 2 While
Professor Amato applauds this narrowing of antitrust policy, he
does not advocate an exclusive Chicago School-like reliance on
economic efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust. He reasons that
8. Id. at 68-69.
9. Council Regulation No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, O.J. L 257/14 (1990).
10. See AMATO, supra note 1, at 87.
11. Id. at 116.
12. Id. at 116-17.
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although much of European antitrust law has gone too far in
looking to industrial, social, and regional considerations in the
implementation of antitrust law, the other extreme would be a
Chicago School narrowing of antitrust solely to consumer welfare defined as economic efficiency. Professor Amato rejects
both extremes and opts for the nuanced but more complex
middle ground where antitrust law takes into account not only
economic efficiency but also concerns about economic power
for political reasons.
After reviewing and comparing the history and present state
of U.S. and European antitrust law and policy, Professor Amato
returns to the broader political themes. He is particularly instructive in discussing how political history helps explain other
differences between U.S. and European law and policy. For example, the Jeffersonian notion of a society of small citizen-farmers that inspired the Sherman Act did not generate liberal democracy in Europe but rather the idea of a communist utopia.
This dramatically different outcome is explained by the American mistrust of the state compared with the traditional European
belief in the state. This difference in political attitudes toward
government is reflected in the fact that the word "state" is not a
common term in the U.S. political vocabulary, whereas the concept of "l'etat" plays a strong role not only in European political
theory but also in popular European political debate. On the
other hand, the early European supporters of antitrust, like Jefferson, also greatly mistrusted economic power but not only because it generated political power. They also mistrusted economic power out of a concern that it reduced social solidarity.
Thus European antitrust law, both at the EC and the Member
State level, takes a stricter and more interventionist view toward
certain business practices and gives less weight to freedom of
contract and to freedom of firms to do business. In a sense, the
Europeans prefer "soft" competition to "hard" competition, as
those terms were used by Judge Learned Hand in his United
States v. Corn Products decision.1 3 It is perhaps inevitable that a
preference for soft over hard competition leads to an interventionist antitrust policy which, in the European case, is reinforced by traditional statist preferences.
In sum, Antitrust And The Bounds of Power contributes to the
13. See United States v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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ongoing debate about antitrust policy goals by providing a
refreshingly broad and eminently wise political perspective. Novices, as well as the cognoscenti, will greatly benefit from a close
reading.

